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Abstract: Scientists have extensively debated the effectiveness of  different emer­
gency response management models, with a particular focus on the “command 
and control” versus “coordination” models. This debate, which focuses on centra­
lized coordination at the tactical and strategic levels, assumes that the activity of 
frontline units within and between response organizations must be aligned and 
that it is possible to exercise control over frontline units. In this article, we discuss 
these assumptions and argue that researchers over estimate the degree to which 
frontline units can and should be centrally  coordinated during the acute phase 
of emergency situations. Instead, we provide a mechanism in which coordination 
naturally emerges from the task at hand when frontline units follow a few simple 
decision rules. In addition, two managerial intervention strategies are presented 
that only may work in specific situations when frontline units are likely to misin­
terpret the environment in which they operate.
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1  Introduction
For many years, researchers have debated how governments and emergency services 
(e.g., police, fire departments and medical services) should organize the response 
to large­scale emergencies, which can be defined as unforeseen, wide­scope and 
complex incidents that irregularly occur and necessitate immediate action under 
high levels of uncertainty and time­pressure (cf. Perry and Lindell 2006). Some 
scholars have argued for a command and control model with a hierarchical chain 
of command that is supposed to ensure an effective inter­ and  intraorganizational 
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response by temporarily centralizing the authority to direct members of multiple 
independent organizations (Bigley and Roberts 2001; Buck et al. 2006; Moynihan 
2009). Others have argued for a coordination model that decentralizes decision 
making and places a premium on cooperation, flexibility and initiative among 
responders of governments, emergency services, relief agencies and emergent vol­
untary organizations at the frontline (Dynes 1994; Drabek 2003; Comfort 2007). In 
the coordination model, effective cooperation between emergency organizations is 
secured by coordination, which is often considered to be a key function of desig­
nated operational, tactical and strategic commanders from the various organiza­
tions involved (Dynes 1994; Drabek 2003). Although the “command and control” 
and “coordination” models exhibit major differences (see e.g., Moynihan 2009), 
they share two underlying assumptions. First, both models presume that activi­
ties must be centrally coordinated to achieve good collaboration, e.g., prevent con­
flicts between tasks executed by different emergency response organizations at the 
scene of the event (Drabek 2003; Buck et al. 2006). Second, because coordination is 
commonly viewed as a managerial function, both models presume that command­
ers at different hierarchical levels are able to exercise control over the responding 
frontline units, such as fire fighters, search and rescue teams or law enforcement 
personnel, in the first hours of large­scale emergencies.
In this article, we compare the “command and control” and “coordination” 
models and present the conflicting evidence regarding these two assumptions, 
which is rarely considered in the current debate. Inspiration for this article stems 
from, on the one hand, consequences of Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) the­
ories on individual decision making, and on the other hand, narratives from prac­
titioners about command and control in the first phase of large­scale emergencies. 
The NDM body of knowledge is based on retrospective accounts and participatory 
analyses of operational decision makers such as fire ground commanders (Klein 
and Calderwood 1988) and has identified significant limitations in the extent to 
which the tasks of frontline responders can be centrally coordinated and directed 
in the first phase of large­scale emergencies. Narratives from experienced tacti­
cal and strategic commanders of the Amsterdam­Amstelland Fire Service (AAF)1 
in the Netherlands have indicated that the task alignment of frontline units is 
almost impossible during the first few hours of large­scale emergency situations. 
AAF commanders have reported that they have little control over their frontline 
units in the first hours of large­scale emergencies, despite their hierarchical posi­
tion in the incident command system. When asked whether this affected the 
cooperation between responding units at the scene of the event, they could not 
provide first­hand examples in which the lack of control created problems.
1 One of the authors was also working as a strategic commander at the AAF.
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We therefore seek to extend the current debate by focusing on the relation 
between the operational or emergency response level, on the one hand, and the tac­
tical and strategic command levels, on the other hand. This article has two goals. 
The first aim is to discuss two assumptions shared by the two predominant emer­
gency management models: (a) the assumption that the tasks of frontline units 
within and between emergency organizations must be centrally coordinated and (b) 
the assumption that higher­echelon decision makers are able to “steer” frontline 
units from a distance. This discussion is centered on the first life­saving phase of the 
emergency response, in which complex work has to be carried out under high levels 
of time pressure and uncertainty. The second aim is to present (a) an alternative 
approach to centralized coordination in which task­adjustment naturally emerges 
from the task at hand when frontline units follow a few simple rules, and (b) two 
managerial intervention strategies which only may work in specific situations when 
frontline units are likely to misinterpret the environment in which they operate.
2  The Scholarly Debate
2.1  The Command and Control Model
The command and control model originated in the USA after World War II (Dynes 
1990). In the absence of knowledge about emergency management and in close 
association with civil defense, military doctrines were used to develop the 
command and control model for emergency response management. Command 
and control is defined as “the exercise of authority and direction by a properly des-
ignated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of 
the mission” (Alberts and Hayes 2006, p. 32). The command and control model can 
be regarded as a prototypical example of classical management thinking (Buck 
et al. 2006), which was the dominant view of management at the time (Stacey 
2000; Mcmillan 2004). In the command and control model, decision making is 
temporarily centralized and functionally specialized to ensure that resources and 
tasks are allocated and put to good use in the most efficient and effective way 
(Alexander 2008). The command and control model envisages a strict division 
between those who decide and control (management) and those who act and 
execute (frontline responders). In the command and control model, the manage­
ment role is to collect information from the field, plan, forecast, coordinate and 
control (Drabek and McEntire 2003), while frontline units provide operational 
information to higher echelon decision makers and simply follow orders from 
above.
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2.2  The Coordination Model
In the 1960s and 1970s, based on research on the appropriateness of organi­
zational structure and the resource dependency model, some emergency 
management researchers argued that command and control models were inap­
propriate for large­scale emergency situations (Dynes and Quarantelli 1969). 
Dynes and Quarantelli (1969) claimed that these events were highly dynamic 
and complex that required flexibility and initiative among the organizations 
involved. Quarantelli (1988, p. 377) stated that “too often disaster planners 
and managers assume that centralized control has to be imposed, from the 
top down, on emergency activities. However, research has consistently shown 
that this is not a good model for disasters and makes the wrong assumptions 
about what is likely to be happening and what is needed. But coordination, not 
control, is what is required and what is partly achievable.” In opposition to the 
command and control model, Quarantelli (1988) and Dynes (1994) proposed 
the coordination model, in which no artificial authority structure was created 
apart from the structure of the “pre­emergency authority”. Dynes (1994, 
p. 150) argued that “using the structure of the pre-emergency community as a 
base, there are a number of mechanisms which can develop coordination. Coor-
dination can be enhanced through common planning and rehearsal activities, 
the establishment of personal contacts, the development of liaison activities 
and the establishment of shared facilities for emergency operations, such as the 
development of emergency operating centers. In effect, the core of emergency 
planning should be directed toward mechanisms, techniques and facilities 
which promote inter-organizational coordination and common decision making, 
rather than in hypothetically establishing the “proper” authority relationships.” 
The coordination model thus recognizes that interdependence within and 
between emergency organizations should not be based on authority and hier­
archical position but on the need to bring together organizational units “as a 
mean to pool resources, authority, knowledge and technology” (O’Toole et al. 
2003; Morris et al. 2007, p. 95).
2.3  Defining Centralized Coordination
The emergency management literature does not provide a universally accepted 
definition of coordination (Helsloot 2008). Sometimes coordination is defined in 
terms of its results. For instance, Dynes and Aguirre (1979) defined coordination 
as “the degree to which there are adequate linkages among organizational parts”. 
Coordination can also be defined as an attempt to integrate and align the tasks 
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to be performed in the response network. Comfort (2007) defined coordination 
as “aligning one’s actions with those of other relevant actors and organizations 
to achieve a shared goal”, which reflects the notion that task­alignment can be 
achieved from the bottom­up (by self­organization at the front line) or top­down 
(by emergency managers). A widely accepted definition of top down coordina­
tion proposed by Malone and Crowston (1990) defines it as “managing interde­
pendencies between activities performed to achieve a goal”. This definition, in 
which coordination is imposed by one or more designated incident commanders, 
seems to predominate in the emergency management literature (for instance, see 
Drabek 2003; Comfort 2007; Moynihan 2009). We refer to this top­down form of 
coordination as “centralized coordination”. Centralized coordination can take 
place between actors of different organizations (inter­organizational) and/or 
between actors within the same organization (intra­organizational). An impor­
tant characteristic of centralized inter­organizational coordination is its volun­
tary nature since emergency managers only have the formal authority over their 
own organizational resources. Comfort (2007) stressed that “the term assumes 
that the participatory actors align their activities voluntarily. If this does not occur, 
managers are left with only two options. They can either coerce the recalcitrant 
actors into changing their performance (at which point the process can no longer 
be called coordination), or they can ignore the fact that some actors are not par-
ticipating fully and essentially become ‘free riders’.” Centralized coordination thus 
assumes the need for and possibility of intra­organizational control by managers 
of their frontline units.
Table 1 summarizes the differences between “command and control”, “central­
ized coordination” and “coordination” regarding how task­alignment is organized.
Different mechanisms are proposed in the literature to align frontline activi­
ties (for a review see Roberts 2011).
Table 1 Three Forms of Alignment of Activities at the Scene of the Event.
Inter-organizational Intra-organizational
Command 
and control
Hierarchical alignment of activities 
by a designated commander
Hierarchical alignment of activities by 
a designated commander
Centralized 
coordination
Voluntary alignment of  activities 
by commanders of different 
 organizations
Hierarchical alignment of activities by 
a designated commander ( = command 
and control)
Coordination Voluntary alignment of activities 
by two or more actors of different 
organizations
Voluntary alignment of activities 
by two or more actors of the same 
organization
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3   Centralized Coordination in Incident Command 
Systems (ICS)
3.1  Centralized Coordination in Policy
This section briefly discusses the incident command systems (ICS) in the UK, the 
Netherlands and the USA, which are the systems most commonly analyzed in the 
literature. These systems all assume that centralized coordination is required and 
that emergency managers are able to direct the activities of their organizations 
performed at the frontline in the first phase of large­scale emergencies.
In the United Kingdom, the incident command system consists of three coor­
dination levels – termed bronze, silver and gold – that may operate during a 
large­scale incident (HM Government 2008). The tasks performed by individuals 
or crews at the scene are directed and controlled by sector (Bronze) commanders 
to achieve the operational objectives determined by incident (Silver) command­
ers, who centrally coordinate and provide overview of operations on the ground. 
Strategic decision making at the Gold level of command is exercised only in the 
most serious situations (Arbuthnot 2008). Depending on the nature of the inci­
dent, the police or fire service is ultimately in charge of the incident (ibid).
The Netherlands follows a similar emergency response management model 
that incorporates many principles of the command and control model and cen­
tralized coordination (Scholtens 2008). In the Netherlands – in contrast to the UK 
incident command system – decision making at the tactical level does not occur 
at the scene of the event but is located near the strategic level command, and no 
single emergency organization is in charge of overall emergency operations. The 
mayor of the municipality or safety region in which the incident occurs is primar­
ily responsible for emergency operations (Scholtens 2008). The mayor designates 
an operational leader who under his or hers authority leads the operations.
The design of the USA Incident Command System also reflects elements of 
the command and control model and centralized coordination (Moynihan 2009). 
Buck et al. (2006, p. 1) describe several types of ICS, which all include the fol­
lowing program elements: standardized job descriptions with a training program 
for those positions; common terms for equipment and supplies; a hierarchical 
chain of command from the specialist on the ground to the incident commander 
that emphasizes the unity of command, with each individual in the organization 
reporting to one supervisor; authority commensurate with responsibility; a span 
of control limited to the number of people that one person can effectively control; 
and division of labor to insure efficiency, effectiveness and safety. Finally, fol­
lowing a scalar principle, the size and complexity of the ICS depends on the size 
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and complexity of the disaster or emergency incident that it addresses. According 
to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), “ICS is a fundamental 
form of management established in a standard format, with the purpose of ena-
bling incident managers to identify the key concerns associated with the incident – 
often under urgent conditions. ICS is used to organize on-scene operations for a 
broad spectrum of emergencies from small to complex incident, both natural and 
manmade. The field response level is where emergency management/response per-
sonnel, under the command of an appropriate authority, carry out tactical deci-
sions and activities in direct response to an incident or threat” (FEMA 2008, p. 46). 
Centralized coordination is mirrored in the concept of unified command, which 
means that incident command is shared by two or more individuals, each having 
authority in a different responding agency (FEMA 2008). But it is also reflected in 
the obligation to make an Incident Action Plan (IAP) as formulated in the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS). According to the NIMS (FEMA 2008, p. 47) 
“centralized, coordinated incident action planning should guide all response activi-
ties. An IAP provides a concise, coherent means of capturing and communicating 
the overall incident priorities, objectives, strategies and tactics in the context of 
both operational and support activities. Every incident must have an action plan.”
3.2  Centralized Coordination in Practice
In general, researchers who have studied how an ICS operates have reported that, 
in practice, there are differences between the operations that are expected accord­
ing plan and those that are observed (Dynes and Quarantelli 1976; Quarantelli 
1986; Dynes 1990, 1994; Schneider 1992; Flin 1996; Drabek and McEntire 2003; 
Tierney and Trainor 2004; Helsloot 2005; Buck et al. 2006; Comfort and Kapucu 
2006; Corbacioglu and Kapucu 2006; Comfort 2007; Arbuthnot 2008; Helsloot 
2008; Kapucu 2008, 2009; Scholtens 2008; Helsloot et al. 2009; Moynihan 2009; 
Boin and ‘t Hart 2010; Leonard and Howitt 2010). Although incident command 
systems are presumed to unify authority, researchers have found that, in practice, 
authority is shared and decision making is decentralized. In a study of ICS opera­
tions in different large­scale incidents in the USA, Moynihan (2009) concluded 
that the ICS structure did not clearly identify who was in charge. According to 
the author, “…the incident commander is not truly a commander. He can issue an 
order, but whether and how the order is obeyed depends upon the willingness of the 
network members to accept the legitimacy of his position and the specific task.” 
Moynihan therefore discussed the concepts of “shared authority” and “network 
governance” in large­scale emergency situations. Based on many field studies, 
Quarantelli (1988) and Dynes (1994) noted that tightening up the hierarchy to 
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exercise control over frontline responders is ineffective during the first hours of 
large­scale emergencies because of the time required for the higher hierarchical 
levels to acquire a sufficient understanding of what is going on, while large­scale 
emergencies typically demand immediate decision making (Quarantelli 1985; 
Dynes 1994; Flin 1996). These authors found that, in large­scale emergencies, 
most decisions of what to do and how to do it were made by individuals with 
ongoing direct access to the problem at hand rather than by emergency managers 
at a distance. Boin and ‘t Hart (2010, p. 362) arrived at a similar conclusion and 
stated that it was impossible to control the initial actions of frontline responders: 
“The first phase of a crisis will inevitably be marked by a lack of information, com-
munication and coordination, and at that time it is impossible to control each and 
every move of first responders.”
Despite the problems associated with incident command systems, research­
ers have positively assessed the incident command system structure for emer­
gency management overall. Although Leonard and Howitt (2010) recognized 
the importance of decentralized decision making in large­scale emergencies, 
they noted that the ICS and unified command are widely used and have empiri­
cally been proven useful and flexible and robust in many situations. Therefore, 
they concluded that “It probably makes more sense to harmonize on and practice 
making this system work than it would to redesign it significantly or adopt a com-
pletely new approach” (Leonard and Howitt 2010, p. 383). Similarly, Moynihan 
(2009) stated that the “continuing practitioner preference for the ICS suggests a 
functional value not acknowledged by its critics. Responders need a central coordi-
nating mechanism to direct resources and resolve conflict in a timely fashion.” Boin 
and ‘t Hart (2010) argued that the often observed importance of the crisis man­
agement structure was overrated in the literature. According to these authors, 
the quality of communication, coordination and collaboration within, across and 
beyond emergency services rather than formal structures primarily influenced 
the quality of crisis responses. In this regard, the authors regard the ICS as an 
appropriate structure for providing order and helping emergency organizations 
to perform their tasks in a coordinated fashion (Boin and ‘t Hart 2010, p. 366).
4   A Closer Examination of the Literature: Three 
Observations
Although incident command systems may be sufficient to organize the emergency 
response after the initial, life­saving phase of large­scale emergency situations 
(which may explain the reported practitioner preferences for ICS), there seems to 
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be limited and even conflicting empirical evidence regarding some of its underly­
ing assumptions. This section more closely examines the literature on emergency 
management and presents three observations. First, we note that many research­
ers focusing on incident command systems draw conclusions about effective ICS 
functioning often without examining the operations at the scene of the event. 
Second, we show that there are conflicting views regarding the assumption 
that tasks of frontline responders need to be centrally coordinated within and 
between response organizations. Finally, we observe that the emergency manage­
ment literature overestimates the ability and need to exercise control over front­
line responders in the first hours of large­scale emergency situations.
Observation 1: Research focuses on the higher hierarchical levels of inci-
dent command systems rather than the overall connection between these 
levels and the emergency operation at the frontline.
Researchers studying incident command systems have suggested that because the 
ICS structure has proven useful, flexible and robust in many situations, it is widely 
employed by practitioners (Moynihan 2009; Leonard and Howitt 2010). Leonard 
and Howitt (2010, p. 381) claimed that incident command systems “work surprisingly 
well even in large, complex events.” However, only a few scientific studies, which 
primarily address the suppression and management of brushfires, have empirically 
supported the claim of effective ICS functioning (e.g., Leonard and Howitt 2010).
Police Ambulance
Tactical level (“Silver”)
Operational level (“Bronze”)
Frontline
=Line of command/order
=Assumed coordination need
=Frontline units
Fire brigade ...
Strategic level (“Gold”)
Figure 1 The Debate Focus Primarily on the Tactical (silver) and Strategic (gold) Coordination 
Levels (Gray box).
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A large portion of the literature on emergency response management focuses 
on the higher hierarchical levels of incident command systems rather than the 
operational level or on the overall connection between the higher hierarchical 
levels and the actual frontline response (for notable exceptions, see Helsloot 
2005; Berlin and Carlstrom 2008, 2011). These studies provide significant insight 
into the way emergency managers of different emergency organizations arrive to 
decisions and collaborate. However, they provide little information regarding the 
effect of the functioning of unified command on the response at the operational 
level or the overall functioning of the incident command system. The public 
administration literature has found that the behaviors of frontline units, such as 
policemen and firefighters, are influenced not only by what managers want them 
to do but also by their own moral judgments, which are based on their personal 
knowledge and interactions with the social environment (Lipsky 1980; Considine 
and Lewis 2003; Maynard­Moody and Musheno 2003). These considerations indi­
cate that the ICS must be studied in relation to the activities at the incident before 
conclusions about the effective functioning of ICS can be drawn. Three examples 
that clarify this issue are presented.
Chen et al. (2007) examined crisis coordination during the 2006 snowstorm in 
New York. He and his coauthors studied how the incident command system oper­
ated during the incident and identified several coordination deficiencies at the 
tactical and strategic levels but did not investigate how these deficiencies influ­
enced actions at the operational level. Lutz and Lindell (2008), who examined the 
degree to which the use of the ICS influenced the performance of 22 Texas Emer­
gency Operations Centers (EOCs) during Hurricane Rita, found that the tasks each 
ICS section performed varied substantially from one EOC to another. Moreover – in 
contrast to the EOC’s physical environment – the ICS experience and ICS imple­
mentation were not significantly correlated with the dependent variable of team 
climate. However, the researchers did not investigate how team climate influenced 
the actual response at the operational level. Finally, Moynihan’s (2009) analysis 
of the functioning of the US incident command system during several large­scale 
emergency situations examined the ICS at the level of the incident commander but 
did not investigate the connection between the functioning of the incident com­
mander and the decision making of emergency units in the field.
Observation 2: There are conflicting views regarding the need for central-
ized coordination within and between organizations in the initial phase of 
large-scale emergencies
The literature appears to adopt the more or less implicit assumption that tasks 
performed by frontline responders should be centrally coordinated to achieve 
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an effective response during large­scale emergencies (Waugh and Streib 2006; 
Moynihan 2008, 2009; McGuire and Silvia 2010; Leonard and Howitt 2010).
First, scholars studying coordination during large­scale emergencies typi­
cally hold the view that collaboration between frontline organizations is neces­
sary to attain an effective emergency response. Kapucu (2005, p. 46) for instance 
argued that an “effective response and recovery operations require collaborations 
and trust between government agencies at all levels and between the public and 
nonprofit sectors.”
However, only a few studies have empirically examined the assumed need 
for collaboration during large­scale emergencies. Berlin and Carlstrom (2008), 
who studied cooperation by emergency services during operational exercises 
in Sweden, investigated the collaboration between police, fire department and 
ambulance services from the arrival of the first units through establishment of 
an accident organization until the mission was completed. The authors found 
that relatively little frontline collaboration occurred. On the contrary, the emer­
gency services basically worked in tandem and only performed tasks within their 
own responsibility. The aim of the response organizations was to establish stabil­
ity by preferring repeated and well­known behavior. The authors found no evi­
dence that increased or closer collaboration would improve the effectiveness of 
the emergency response because there were few interdependencies between the 
responding organizations involved (Berlin and Carlstrom 2008). In another study, 
Berlin and Carlstrom (2011) investigated three types of interagency collaboration – 
Police Ambulance
Tactical level (“Silver”)
Strategic level (“Gold”)
Operational level (“Bronze”)
Frontline
Fire brigade ...
=Line of command/order
=Assumed coordination need
=Frontline units
Figure 2 The Assumed Need to Centrally Coordinate the Tasks of Frontline Responders (Gray 
box).
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sequential, parallel and synchronous – during emergency work. The authors 
found that organizations at an accident scene avoided collaboration both because 
this would lead to uncertainty and due to the lack of incentives for collabora­
tion. Berlin and Carlstrom (2011, p. 169) noted that “the commands did not have 
incentives to develop cooperation between the organizations… the commanding 
officers met for a short time at the management location, but their attention was 
concentrated on their own staff and operational activities at the accident site.” The 
authors concluded that increased or improved collaboration would not produce a 
more effective or efficient emergency response.
Second, the coordination literature commonly presumes that centralized 
coordination is needed to achieve good collaboration. Leonard and Howitt 
(2010, p. 379) for instance put forward that (centralized) coordination is needed 
to resolve conflicts that may arise when the actions of two or more independent 
units interfere with each other’s operations.
Based on evaluations of large­scale emergencies in the Netherlands, 
Scholtens (2008) rejected the assumption that centralized coordination is neces­
sary in order to achieve or maintain sufficient task­adjustment at the front line. 
She reported that “it seems that emergency services actually work reasonably well 
together in the field, in spite of the reigning chaos in the level above them and of the 
failure of the coordination mechanism that is supposed to operate in such situa-
tions.” Similarly, Helsloot (2008) challenged the view that central coordination of 
frontline responders is required to attain good collaboration by arguing that front­
line responders of different organizations may work successfully side­by­side 
without central coordination. Helsloot discussed the work of Donahue (2006), 
who described the debris recovery operations for the space shuttle Colombia and 
the remains of its crew. Donahue reported that these operations were successful 
because of good collaboration based on the explicit articulation of a common 
vision, a focus on problem solving rather than rule following, shared values and 
joint planning. However, Donahue (2006, p. 141) stressed that initial response 
to the crash was chaotic and poorly managed. She stated: “Dozens of communi-
ties immediately activated their emergency plans and operations centers. Police, 
firefighters, the National Guard, the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army and 
scores of other agencies and volunteers poured to help. Most of these organizations 
had never worked together before, and many involved had little formal knowledge 
of incident command and management procedures.” Helsloot (2008) concluded 
therefore that a closer examination of the recovery operation indicated that this 
operation was best described as “working together apart”, in which each organi­
zation performed its own operations effectively without centralized coordination.
Third, centralized coordination is often perceived to be necessary in the coor­
dination literature to obtain the “big picture” of overall operations to ensure that 
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critical dimensions of the situation are correctly identified and to periodically 
revise the overall response strategy. Again, this assumption can be challenged. 
Researchers have noted that in complex network settings, such as the response 
network in the case of a large­scale emergency, no “detached” observer is able to 
oversee the response network (Kickert et al. 1997; Wheatley 2006; Scholtens 2008; 
Stacey 2010). Distributed Decision Making (DDM) provides a useful approach for 
understanding the difficulties of centralized coordination in large­scale emer­
gency situations (Rasmussen et al. 1991; Brehmer 2000; Scholtens 2008). DDM 
assumes that that it is impossible to understand and control all of the different 
and complex aspects of dynamic organizations through a centralized decision­
making process (Schneeweiss 2003). Because a single individual unit can only 
affect a restricted area and process a limited amount of information, DDM pro­
poses that complex problems should be divided into smaller components and 
that the size of these components be matched to the individual’s information 
processing abilities. Because individuals may attempt to resolve a larger problem 
in different ways, it becomes almost impossible to identify a global pattern or to 
forecast how an intervention by one actor will affect the decision making of other 
individual response units in the field (Rasmussen et al. 1991; Scholtens 2008). 
DDM proposes that each individual unit should make its own decisions as inde­
pendently as possible within the main outlines of the overall goal (Rasmussen 
et al. 1991).
Police Ambulance
Tactical level (“Silver”)
Strategic level (“Gold”)
Operational level (“Bronze”)
Frontline
Fire brigade ...
=Line of command/order
=Assumed coordination need
=Frontline units
Figure 3 The Assumed Ability and Need to Exercise Control over Frontline Responders (gray 
box).
Brought to you by | Radboud University Nijmegen
Authenticated | 131.174.249.69
Download Date | 1/23/14 12:46 PM
126      Jelle Groenendaal et al.
Observation 3: Both the literature and practitioners overestimate the ability 
and need to exercise control over frontline responders during the initial 
phase of large-scale emergencies
Researchers as well as practitioners tend to overestimate the ability and need to 
exercise control over frontline responders during the initial phase of emergen­
cies. However, the limited ability to exercise control is rarely addressed in the 
literature on emergency response management.
The literature provides little empirical evidence to support the assumption 
that frontline responders can be hierarchically controlled during the first phase 
of large­scale emergencies. On the contrary, the literature identifies many exam­
ples that reveal problems in directing emergency responders in the initial phase 
of large­scale emergency situations. For example, Smith and Dowell (2000) inves­
tigated coordination during the 1995 Ais Gill railway accident in the UK with a 
focus on the coordination activities of emergency managers. At the onset of the 
incident, the first emergency managers of the fire departments, medical services 
and police at the scene discussed three options for transporting the casualties to 
the nearest hospitals because the transport was made difficult by the remoteness 
and inaccessibility of the location. Although one option was chosen, none of the 
incident commanders were able to carry out this decision, and the three options 
for casualty transport were pursued in parallel. The authors claim that their study 
reveals the difficulty of shared meaning­making and interagency coordination in 
emergencies. However, we would argue that this study indicates that the com­
manders were unable to implement the chosen course of action and had little 
control on what occurred inside and outside the accident site. The Oklahoma 
City bombing, in which the ICS functioning was generally perceived as success­
ful (Moynihan 2009), provides another example. The evaluation report provides 
several instances in which emergency responders followed their own intuition 
rather than orders from supervisors. For example, the report stated that “while 
police officers were given assignments on perimeters and in positions limiting 
access to the scene, some officers and supervisors left their posts to participate in 
the rescue operations. Some officers appeared to become emotionally involved and 
had difficulty following instructions” (Oklahoma City Bombing inquiry 1996, p. 35). 
In addition, the evaluation report stated that “throughout the incident, there was 
a constant concern as to the number of officers on-site, their locations and duties. 
Field personnel frequently utilized the personnel without on-site command post 
personnel being advised” (ibid).
Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) provides a useful approach for under­
standing the limited ability to exercise control in emergency situations (Zsambok 
and Klein 1997). NDM describes how experienced decision makers make decisions 
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in naturalistic settings, which exhibit time pressures, ambiguous information, 
high stakes and uncertainty. Zsambok and Klein (1997, p. 5) defined NDM as “how 
experienced people, working as individuals or groups in dynamic, uncertain and 
often fast paced environments, identify and assess their situation, make decisions 
and take actions whose consequences are meaningful to them and to the larger 
organization in which they operate.” The recognition­primed decision­making 
model (RPD) can be considered a prototypical NDM model (Lipshitz et al. 2001).
The RPD model is a prominent example of an NDM model that was originally 
based on the observations and retrospective accounts of fire ground commanders 
(Klein et al. 1989). Klein et al. (1989) investigated how fire ground commanders 
handled time pressure and uncertainty and found that, in most cases, experienced 
fire ground commanders did not analyze options when choosing a course of action 
but instead performed the first action that came to mind. The authors found that 
when experienced decision makers operated under conditions of time pressure 
and uncertainty, they quickly recognized cue patterns signaling a particular type 
of problem, and this fast recognition triggered the retrieval of responses previously 
associated with a similar cue pattern, which led to successful problem resolution. 
Consequently, experienced decision makers made workable – but not always 
optimal – decisions almost instantaneously. In large­scale emergency situations, 
therefore, frontline units decided in a split second to what they would do based on 
preceding incidents and easily communicated procedures. Regardless of the scale 
of the incident, firefighters arriving at a scene attempt to put out the first fires they 
come across and rescue the first people they see, medical personnel concentrate 
on treating victims and the police focus on restoring order (Scholtens 2008).
NDM has significant implications for those seeking to direct frontline deci­
sions. Because decision makers facing time pressure and uncertainty operate as 
they would in similar conditions, it is very hard to control these decisions, partic­
ularly if emergency responders are instructed to do something that conflicts with 
typical practice. An illustrative example is provided by the wildfire near Storm 
King Mountain in which several firefighters failed to drop their tools to escape 
the danger (Weick 2001, p. 322–323). Weick (2001) stated that “On July 6 1994, 
near Glenwood Springs, Colorado, a mixed crew of smokejumpers and hotshots 
were constructing a fire line downhill on the east slope of a valley near Storm King 
Mountain. The fire they were trying to stop circled around them on the south and 
started up the west slope of the valley. Portions of it spotted across to the east slope 
underneath them and overran them with flame heights of 150 feet while they were 
retreating up to the ridge to upon the east slope. A group of firefighters already on 
the ridge top yelled at them to speed up and drop their tools, but they did not. The 
firefighters died with their tools at hand.” In this example, which is consistent with 
NDM, the smokejumpers were unable to drop their tools, although colleagues and 
Brought to you by | Radboud University Nijmegen
Authenticated | 131.174.249.69
Download Date | 1/23/14 12:46 PM
128      Jelle Groenendaal et al.
commanders ordered them to do so, because it was contrary to what they had 
learned. Therefore, Weick (2001, p. 325) stated that, “People who have been trained 
to carry out whatever equipment they carry in to a fire or whatever is dropped to 
them, people who hear repeatedly how much equipment costs, and people who 
practice carrying heavier and heavier loads, faster for longer periods, on sleeper 
slopes, might be at disadvantage when, without any prior experience of what it feels 
like or how to do it, they are told to drop their tools and their packs.”
NDM also provides a plausible explanation for the assumption that opera­
tional commanders, such as battalion chiefs, are “in control” of their organi­
zational members in the initial phase of emergencies. Based on NDM, orders 
consistent with everyday practices are likely to be carried out by frontline respond­
ers because these practices are obvious to the responders. If we assume that most 
orders given in emergency situations are consistent with day­to­day practices, 
there is little need for operational commanders to really direct the activities of 
emergency responders in the initial stage of emergencies.
NDM fits in the observation by Dynes and Aguirre (1979) who have suggested 
that emergency response organizations are basically coordinated through plan­
ning and feedback. Coordination through planning is based on pre­established 
schedules and programs directing and standardizing the functioning of organiza­
tions, and coordination through feedback is centered in the transmission of new 
information so as to facilitate the mutual adjustment of parts.
5   An Alternative to Centralized Coordination: 
Facilitating Self-Organization at the Frontline
This section presents an alternative approach to centralized coordination in 
which task­adjustment naturally emerges from the task at hand when frontline 
units follow a few simple rules. In addition, two managerial intervention strate­
gies already used in practice are described. These strategies only may work in 
specific situations when frontline units are likely to misinterpret the environment 
in which they operate.
5.1  Task-Adjustment Through Stigmergy
Stigmergy is a form of self­organizing, bottom­up coordination in which activities 
are neither centrally controlled nor locally supervised; it is generated by placing 
signs and modifying the environment (Bonabeau and Meyer 2001). Grassé (1959), 
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a French zoologist who studied animal sociology, first introduced the concept 
of stigmergy to explicate the mechanisms underlying the emergence, regulation 
and control of social insects. Grasse discovered that the activities of social insects 
were coordinated and regulated through indirect communication mediated by 
modifications of the environment, which was termed stigmergy (Marsh and Onof 
2008). Theraulaz and Bonabeau (1999, p. 111) described the basic principle of stig­
mergy more simply as “Traces left and modifications made by individuals in their 
environment and may feed back on them.”
Stigmergy in social insects is illustrated by the food foraging of ants (Valcke­
nears et al. 2006). In the absence of environmental signals, ants randomly search 
for food. When an ant discovers a food source, it deposits an odorant pheromone 
as it returns to the nest with some of the food, generating a pheromone trail 
between the nest and the food source that will evaporate if no other ants deposit 
fresh pheromones. When another ant senses a pheromone trail, its instincts will 
lead it to follow the trail to the food source. When it locates the food source, it 
deposits more pheromone to maintain and strengthen the pheromone trail. When 
the food source is exhausted, the ants return to a randomized search for food, and 
the trail evaporates (Valckenaers et al. 2006).
Valckenaers et  al. (2006) identified three distinguishing characteristics of 
stigmergy. First, patterns of self­organization are generated without the need 
for direct communication between organizational members, which is significant 
because poor communication between frontline responders is almost inevitable 
in emergency situations. Second, the environment shields the decision maker 
from the complexity of the environment because global information is locally 
available and a complete operational “picture” is not required before units can 
perform a task. Finally, the information is accurate because its lifetime is limited 
and refreshed only as long as it remains valid, which allows the recognition­
primed decision­making behavior of emergency responders to be efficient and 
effective.
A practical example of stigmergy is illustrated by the 2011 Fireworks disaster 
in the Netherlands. After the explosion, which destroyed more than 1000 resi­
dential buildings, firefighters and other rescue workers searched the buildings 
for possible casualties. The emergency responders agreed to place colored signs 
on the doors of buildings that had previously been searched for victims. By using 
a simple rule (“when a sign is painted on the door, I will take the next one”), emer­
gency responders were able to search buildings effectively and efficiently without 
any central supervision (Oosting Committee 2001). In this example, coordina­
tion followed from the task itself rather than from emergency managers’ coor­
dination activities. Interestingly, although this procedure has been adopted by 
Urban Search and Rescue Teams (USAR), the firefighters devised this procedure 
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independently in the Fireworks disaster (Oosting Committee 2001). Berlin and 
Carlstrom (2008) provided another example of stigmergy by describing how 
various “signals” initially placed in the environment influenced the decisions 
made by frontline responders: “The choice of points of entry, command centre 
location, and vehicle positions in relation to the object of the accident became pre-
cedent during the rest of work” (Berlin and Carlstrom 2008, p. 180).
5.2  Two Managerial Intervention Strategies
Stigmergy is based on the recognition of locally available information, which 
may occasionally lead to poor decision outcomes (Leonard and Howitt 2010). 
Based on NDM, two specific situations can be described. First, experienced 
decision makers operating under time pressure base their decisions on the 
rapid recognition of local environmental cues, which might lead to decisions 
that are optimal at the micro level but suboptimal at a macro level. For instance, 
different firefighting teams who use locally available information to suppress 
a fire might approach a fire from opposite sides of a building without knowing 
about each other, which may increase the flames on the opposite side and harm 
one of the teams. This occurred during the response to the 2008 fatal fire in De 
Punt in the Netherlands (Helsloot et al. 2009). Second, decisions made on a day­
to­day basis may be inappropriate in certain situations and require alternative 
interventions. For instance, in the wildfire situation described in Weick (2001), 
it would have been better to violate the standard operating procedure of carry­
ing equipment at all times by dropping the equipment and fleeing from the fire.
For these two specific situations, direct and indirect managerial intervention 
strategies that draw on NDM may be more broadly applied in practice. However, 
these strategies cannot be applied often or in every situation. The first strat­
egy provides direct control through a simple decision rule taught to emergency 
responders prior to an event requiring immediate evacuation, with a simple 
outcome for the decision rule. For instance, a specific whistle signal can be asso­
ciated with immediate danger and a complete drawback of all field units. This is 
the current practice in US fire departments, where a whistle is currently used to 
order the evacuation of firefighters inside a burning building. Although everyone 
in the response network would be able to use this signal, it should rarely be used 
due to its extended range and because its effectiveness would be diminished if it 
were applied too often or incorrectly.
The second managerial intervention strategy is based on indirect control by 
influencing the behavior of organizational units by making subtle changes in their 
environment based on an accurate prediction about how emergency responders 
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will behave in a given situation. This strategy is more difficult to apply because 
it requires an extensive understanding of how emergency responders typically 
operate in similar conditions. The strategy was successfully applied by the inci­
dent commander at the 1998 Eschede train collision, which led to 101 deaths and 
103 injuries (Hüls and Oestern 1999). On June 3, 1998, a high­speed train traveling 
at 200 kilometers per hour collided with a bridge and caused it to collapse. As a 
result, the train broke into two pieces. An emergency manager, who arrived at 
the scene and observed the initial response from a hill at a distance, noticed that 
the train wreckage was separated into two large areas, one near the bridge and 
one far from the bridge. However, following the usual operating procedures, all 
the arriving units proceeded to the first visible accident site because they were 
unaware of the other disaster site. Due to nonfunctional communication systems, 
the incident commander was unable to inform the arriving units about the two 
accident sites (Köbl 1999; Lange 1999). However, based on the expectation that 
the first responders would drive directly to the first wreckage site they came 
across, the incident commander directed a fire engine to block the main road to 
detour arriving units. Because these units had to take a different road, they were 
effectively directed to the second accident site (Köbl 1999).
6  Conclusion
In this article, we have demonstrated that the debate on emergency response 
management would benefit from a deeper understanding of the response that 
occurs at the scene of the event during the first phase of large­scale emergency 
situations. Based on the preceding analysis, we conclude that for large­scale 
emergencies, centralized coordination is initially difficult to achieve because 
supervisors at this stage often do not possess the required and reliable informa­
tion. In addition, in the acute phase of the emergency response we argue that 
emergency managers have no possibility to exercise control to align activities at 
the scene of the event. More fundamentally, the analysis raises the issue of the 
extent to which centralized coordination is necessary in the first hours of large­
scale emergencies, which is a question that certainly demands further research.
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